Text of MS SB 2363 (2026)
Juries; prohibit peremptory challenges based on certain factors.
Legislative text is a public record. Where LegiScan supplied it, the CC BY 4.0 credit applies.
Source: LegiScan. Bill data and text from LegiScan (legiscan.com), licensed CC BY 4.0 and used in modified form. LegiScan does not endorse the Trans Data Initiative. License: CC BY 4.0(opens another site). Source page(opens another site)
As introduced
14,600 characters
MISSISSIPPI LEGISLATURE
2026 Regular Session
To: Judiciary, Division A
By: Senator(s) Simmons (12th)
Senate Bill 2363
AN ACT TO PROHIBIT A PARTY FROM USING A PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE
TO REMOVE A PROSPECTIVE JUROR ON THE BASIS OF THE PROSPECTIVE JUROR'S RACE,
ETHNICITY, GENDER, GENDER IDENTITY, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, NATIONAL ORIGIN, OR
RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION, OR THE PERCEIVED MEMBERSHIP OF THE PROSPECTIVE JUROR IN
ANY OF THOSE GROUPS; TO AUTHORIZE A PARTY, OR THE TRIAL COURT ON ITS OWN
MOTION, TO OBJECT TO THE USE OF A PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE BASED ON THESE CRITERIA;
TO REQUIRE THE PARTY EXERCISING THE CHALLENGE, UPON OBJECTION, TO STATE THE
REASONS THE PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE HAS BEEN EXERCISED; TO REQUIRE THE COURT TO
EVALUATE THE REASONS GIVEN AND, IF THE COURT GRANTS THE OBJECTION, AUTHORIZE
THE COURT TO TAKE CERTAIN ACTIONS, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, STARTING A
NEW JURY SELECTION, DECLARING A MISTRIAL AT THE REQUEST OF THE OBJECTING PARTY,
SEATING THE CHALLENGED JUROR, OR PROVIDING ANOTHER REMEDY AS THE COURT DEEMS
APPROPRIATE; TO PROVIDE FOR A DE NOVO STANDARD OF REVIEW BY AN APPELLATE COURT
REVIEWING THE DENIAL OF AN OBJECTION; TO PROVIDE THAT THE ACT APPLIES TO
CRIMINAL JURY TRIALS IN WHICH JURY SELECTION BEGINS ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1,
2027; TO PROVIDE THAT THE ACT APPLIES TO CIVIL JURY TRIALS IN WHICH JURY
SELECTION BEGINS ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2029; AND FOR RELATED PURPOSES.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF MISSISSIPPI:
SECTION 1.
(1) The Legislature finds:
(a) That peremptory
challenges are frequently used in criminal cases to exclude potential jurors
from serving based on their race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual
orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership
in any of those groups, and that exclusion from jury service has
disproportionately harmed African Americans, Latinos, and other people of
color;
(b) That the existing
procedure for determining whether a peremptory challenge was exercised on the
basis of a legally impermissible reason has failed to eliminate that
discrimination; and
(c) That requiring
proof of intentional bias renders the procedure ineffective and that many of
the reasons routinely advanced to justify the exclusion of jurors from
protected groups are, in fact, associated with stereotypes about those groups
or otherwise based on unlawful discrimination.
(2) The intent of the Legislature
is:
(a) To put into place
an effective procedure for eliminating the unfair exclusion of potential jurors
based on race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national
origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those
groups, through the exercise of peremptory challenges;
(b) That this act be
broadly construed to further the purpose of eliminating the use of group
stereotypes and discrimination, whether based on conscious or unconscious bias,
in the exercise of peremptory challenges; and
(c) That this act
shall not, in purpose or effect, lower the standard for judging challenges for
cause or expand use of challenges for cause.
(3) Therefore, this act
designates several justifications as presumptively invalid and provides a
remedy for both conscious and unconscious bias in the use of peremptory
challenges.
SECTION 2. (1)
A party shall not use a peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror on
the basis of the prospective juror's race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity,
sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or the perceived
membership of the prospective juror in any of those groups.
(2) A party, or the trial
court on its own motion, may object to the improper use of a peremptory
challenge under subsection (1) of this section. After the objection is made,
any further discussion shall be conducted outside the presence of the panel.
The objection shall be made before the jury is impaneled, unless information
becomes known that could not have reasonably been known before the jury was
impaneled.
(3) Upon objection to the
exercise of a peremptory challenge pursuant to this section, the party
exercising the peremptory challenge shall state the reasons the peremptory
challenge has been exercised.
(4) (a) The court shall
evaluate the reasons given to justify the peremptory challenge in light of the
totality of the circumstances. The court shall consider only the reasons
actually given and shall not speculate on, or assume the existence of, other
possible justifications for the use of the peremptory challenge. If the court
determines there is a substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable
person would view race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation,
national origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of
those groups, as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge, then the
objection shall be sustained. The court need not find purposeful
discrimination to sustain the objection. The court shall explain the reasons
for its ruling on the record. A motion brought under this section shall also
be deemed a sufficient presentation of claims asserting the discriminatory
exclusion of jurors in violation of the United States and Mississippi
Constitutions;
(b) (i) For purposes
of this section, an objectively reasonable person is aware that unconscious
bias, in addition to purposeful discrimination, has resulted in the unfair
exclusion of potential jurors in the State of Mississippi;
(ii) For purposes
of this section, a "substantial likelihood" means more than a mere
possibility but less than a standard of more likely than not; and
(iii) For purposes
of this act, "unconscious bias" includes implicit and institutional
biases; and
(c) In making its
determination, the circumstances the court may consider include, but are not
limited to, any of the following:
(i) Whether any of
the following circumstances exist:
1. The
objecting party is a member of the same perceived cognizable group as the
challenged juror;
2. The
alleged victim is not a member of that perceived cognizable group; and
3. Witnesses
or the parties are not members of that perceived cognizable group;
(ii) Whether race,
ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or
religious affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups, bear on
the facts of the case to be tried;
(iii) The number
and types of questions posed to the prospective juror, including, but not
limited to, any the following:
1.
Consideration of whether the party exercising the peremptory challenge failed
to question the prospective juror about the concerns later stated by the party
as the reason for the peremptory challenge pursuant to subsection (3) of this
section;
2. Whether
the party exercising the peremptory challenge engaged in cursory questioning of
the challenged potential juror; and
3. Whether
the party exercising the peremptory challenge asked different questions of the
potential juror against whom the peremptory challenge was used in contrast to
questions asked of other jurors from different perceived cognizable groups
about the same topic or whether the party phrased those questions differently;
(iv) Whether other
prospective jurors, who are not members of the same cognizable group as the
challenged prospective juror, provided similar, but not necessarily identical,
answers but were not the subject of a peremptory challenge by that party;
(v) Whether a reason
might be disproportionately associated with a race, ethnicity, gender, gender
identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or
perceived membership in any of those groups;
(vi) Whether the
reason given by the party exercising the peremptory challenge was contrary to
or unsupported by the record; and
(vii) Whether the
counsel or counsel's office exercising the challenge has used peremptory
challenges disproportionately against a given race, ethnicity, gender, gender
identity, sexual orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or
perceived membership in any of those groups, in the present case or in past
cases, including whether the counsel or counsel's office who made the challenge
has a history of prior violations under Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S.
79, People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, Section 231.5, or this section.
(5) A peremptory challenge
for any of the following reasons is presumed to be invalid unless the party
exercising the peremptory challenge can show by clear and convincing evidence
that an objectively reasonable person would view the rationale as unrelated to
a prospective juror's race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual
orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation, or perceived membership
in any of those groups, and that the reasons articulated bear on the
prospective juror's ability to be fair and impartial in the case:
(a) Expressing a
distrust of or having a negative experience with law enforcement or the criminal
legal system;
(b) Expressing a
belief that law enforcement officers engage in racial profiling or that
criminal laws have been enforced in a discriminatory manner;
(c) Having a close
relationship with people who have been stopped, arrested or convicted of a
crime;
(d) A prospective
juror's neighborhood;
(e) Having a child
outside of marriage;
(f) Receiving state
benefits;
(g) Not being a native
English speaker;
(h) The ability to
speak another language;
(i) Dress, attire or
personal appearance;
(j) Employment in a
field that is disproportionately occupied by members listed in subsection (1)
of this section or that serves a population disproportionately comprised of
members of a group or groups listed in subsection (1) of this section;
(k) Lack of employment
or underemployment of the prospective juror or prospective juror's family
member;
(l) A prospective
juror's apparent friendliness with another prospective juror of the same group
as listed in subsection (1) of this section; or
(m) Any justification
that is similarly applicable to a questioned prospective juror or jurors, who
are not members of the same cognizable group as the challenged prospective
juror, but were not the subject of a peremptory challenge by that party. The
unchallenged prospective juror or jurors need not share any other
characteristics with the challenged prospective juror for peremptory challenge
relying on this justification to be considered presumptively invalid.
(6) For purposes of
subsection (5) of this section, the term "clear and convincing"
refers to the degree of certainty the factfinder must have in determining
whether the reasons given for the exercise of a peremptory challenge are
unrelated to the prospective juror's cognizable group membership, bearing in
mind conscious and unconscious bias. To determine that a presumption of
invalidity has been overcome, the factfinder shall determine that it is highly
probable that the reasons given for the exercise of a peremptory challenge are
unrelated to conscious or unconscious bias and are instead specific to the
juror and bear on that juror's ability to be fair and impartial in the case.
(7) (a) The following
reasons for peremptory challenges have historically been associated with
improper discrimination in jury selection:
(i) The
prospective juror was inattentive, or staring or failing to make eye contact;
(ii) The
prospective juror exhibited either a lack of rapport or problematic attitude,
body language or demeanor; and
(iii) The
prospective juror provided unintelligent or confused answers.
(b) The reasons set
forth in this paragraph (a) of this subsection are presumptively invalid unless
the trial court is able to confirm that the asserted behavior occurred, based
on the court's own observations or the observations of counsel for the
objecting party. Even with that confirmation, the counsel offering the reason
shall explain why the asserted demeanor, behavior or manner in which the
prospective juror answered questions matters to the case to be tried.
(8) Upon a court granting
an objection to the improper exercise of a peremptory challenge, the court
shall do one or more of the following:
(a) Quash the jury
venire and start jury selection anew. This remedy shall be provided if
requested by the objecting party;
(b) If the motion is
granted after the jury has been impaneled, declare a mistrial and select a new
jury if requested by the defendant;
(c) Seat the
challenged juror;
(d) Provide the
objecting party additional challenges; and
(e) Provide another
remedy as the court deems appropriate;
(9) (a) This section
applies in all criminal jury trials in which jury selection begins on or after
January 1, 2027.
(b) This section
applies in all civil jury trials in which jury selection begins on or after
January 1, 2029.
(10) The denial of an
objection made under this section shall be reviewed by the appellate court de
novo, with the trial court's express factual findings reviewed for substantial
evidence. The appellate court shall not impute to the trial court any
findings, including findings of a prospective juror's demeanor, that the trial
court did not expressly state on the record. The reviewing court shall
consider only reasons actually given under subsection (3) of this section and
shall not speculate as to or consider reasons that were not given to explain
either the party's use of the peremptory challenge or the party's failure to
challenge similarly situated jurors who are not members of the same cognizable
group as the challenged juror, regardless of whether the moving party made a
comparative analysis argument in the trial court. Should the appellate court
determine that the objection was erroneously denied, that error shall be deemed
prejudicial, the judgment shall be reversed, and the case remanded for a new
trial.
(11) The provisions of this
section are severable. If any provision of this section or its application is
held invalid, that invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications
that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application.
SECTION 3. This act
shall take effect and be in force from and after July 1, 2026.